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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
GREAT SALT LAKE AUTHORITY

'

Plaintiff and Respondent,

vs.
ISLAND RANCHING COMPANY,

Case No.
10395

Defendant and Appellant.

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS
The statement of this case and its facts, as presented
by Appellant in its main Brief and acknowledged as accurate in Respondent's Brief, is the basis for this Reply.
STATEMENT OF PURPOSE
In compliance with Rule 75(p) (2), it is intended that
this Reply Brief will meet and respond only to Points,
issues and defenses raised by Respondent in its answering
Brief which were not treated in or covered by Appellant's
main Brief.
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ARGUMENT
POINT II.
THE GSLA ACT IS CONSTITUTIONALLY INVALID FOR ITS FAILURE TO DEFINE OR
DELIMIT THE JURISDICTIONAL BOUNDARIES OF GSLA.
At the outset, Respondent does not deny the proposition that to sustain the constitutionality of 65-8-1 thru 9,
U.C.A. 1953 as amended, the Statute must define the territorial boundaries of GSLA. That point is, in fact, admitted.
Resp. Br., p. 3. It is merely argued that any required territorial definition is clearly set out in 65-8-1 as the "Great
Salt Lake and its environs". Resp. Br., p. 3. Several reasons are given for that conclusion. This Reply will focus
upon those reasons not otherwise discussed in our main
Brief.
Respondent's assertion that 65-8-1 defines the territorial boundaries of GSLA as the "Great Salt Lake and its
environs" is erroneous. A fair reading of that Section does
not at all reveal the boundaries of the Agency. 65-8-1 relates solely to the selection of Agency members and to that
end only, it provides that appointment shall be made of
those who have an interest in and understanding of the
"Great Salt Lake and its environs". Such reference falls
short of a jurisdictional boundary. Nor does any other
Section of the Statute employ the term as a territorial definition.
The basis for Respondent's argument is divisible in
four parts. They are :

[ 1] That although the term "the Lake and its environs" is indeterminate, its significance is easily ascertainable by reference to the title of the Statute which refers to the "surveyed meander" of the Lake. Since the
meaning of the phrase "Great Salt Lake and its environs"
and "surveyed meander" are one and the same, ergo the
jurisdictional boundary of GSLA is "the Lake and its environs". Resp. Br., pp. 3, 6, 7.
The worst enemy this argument has is itself. To begin
with, it relies upon the title to fix the boundary and presumes the same to be part of the substantive legislation,
entitled to such rank in a constitutional interpretation of
the Statute. Such presumption accords the title a much
greater station than the precedent gained of this Court wilJ
allow. The law is clear under Donahue v. Warner Bros.
Picture D?"stributing Corp., 2 U. 2d 256, 272 P. 2d 177
(1954) that the title is not the enacted law, it cannot serve
in that role and further, that its function is only to assist
in interpreting the enacted law. Respondent's argument
disregards Donahue because the title is used not merely as an
auxiliary in interpreting the statutory boundaries of GSLA,
it becomes the very boundary itself. Respondent's entire
argument of constitutional validity hinges upon it. That
the case law is unique which holds that this constitutional
requirement may be furnished by the title to the law, is
supported by the fact that Respondent has not cited any
authority in its Brief.
Furthermore, even were this Court to conclude that
the title to the GSLA Statute may supply the jurisdictional
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boundary, Respondent's argument is yet invalid because
the Statute is clear that the terms "the Great Salt Lake and
its environs" and the "surveyed meander" are not synonomous. Both terms are used side by side in 65-8-6 ( 8) :
"The Authority shall not receive revenues
which accrue to the state land board from mineral
leases or mineral removal from state owned lands
and waters within the Great Salt Lake Meander
Line established by the United States Surveyor
General. All other revenues, including such amounts
as may be made available by the legislature, shall be
reserved for use in the development and administration of the Great Salt Lake and its environs by
the Authority."
The plain meaning of this Section is that the "surveyed
meander" is somewhere within or without but not the same
as the "Great Salt Lake and its environs." Such conclusion
is irresistible because if the two terms were equivalent and
interchangeable as contended by Respondent, one but not
both would have been set out in 65-8-6 ( 8). The other
would have been quite unnecessary. Thus, Respondent's
attempt to save the Statute by relying upon the title (surveyed meander) , to explain the meaning of the term "the
Great Salt Lake and its environs" is futile because that title
refers to a different and independent area.
[2] Respondent argues that a more precise jurisdictional boundary than the "Lake and its environs" would
have been for the Legislature, "impractical and needlessly
confusing." Resp. Br. pp. 7, 33. That is a rather difficult
stand when weighed against the almost legendary rule that
the due process clause requires that a statute notify every-
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one of their rights and liabilities under it, and how their
property will be affected by it. Conally v. General Construction Co., 269 U. S. 385, 46 S. Ct. 126, 70 L. Ed. 322;
State of Utah V. Packard, 122 Utah 369, 250 P. 2d 561
(1952); McDougall v. Lueder, 389 Ill. 141, 58 N. E. 2d 899
( 1945). How such due process requirement is satisfied in
this case is not made apparent by Respondent's argument.
[3] The driving force of Respondent's argument is
best seen in its Brief where having claimed that the "surveyed meander" has something to do with the jurisdictional
boundary, it is admitted as fact that the Lake meander has
never been completely surveyed. Resp. Br., pp. 6, 7. Thus,
the alleged boundary becomes no boundary at all, it being
left open and undefined in unsurveyed areas. To avoid this
pitfall, Respondent asks this Court on page 7 "to judicially
li'mit GSLA to those areas of the Lake where the meander
has been surveyed". Such a request has no parallel in any
decision of this Court or of any other court, nor does Respondent make note of any. The argument is met immediately by the principle that this Court will not pose as a
sort-of secondary legislature, it will not re-write a statute
and it will not supply what the Legislature left out. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm., 107 Utah
502, 155 P. 2d 184 (1945). Such request would have this
Court and not the Legislature fix the limits of GSLA's
jurisdiction. The impending result forecasts the folly of
the argument. As the survey of the Lake's meander progresses, further announcements from this Court will be required with respect to the effect of that survey on the
already judicially established jurisdictional boundary of

GSLA. On and on, the Court would subsequently find itself
defining and limiting territorial boundaries. Such ad hoc
legislation from this Court is far removed from the statement of Cardozo, J., in Anderson v. Wilson, 289 U. S. 20
(1933), "that we take this Statute as we find it".
[ 4] Lastly, Respondent argues that the fact the Lake
meander has never been completely surveyed is irrelevant,
because GSLA in seeking to condemn Antelope Island is
not "exercising any jurisdiction in any unsurveyed area of
the Lake". Resp. Br., pp. 7, 22, 30. The principle overlooked by that statement is that for the purpose of determining whether a statute is constitutionally inadequate
because of the lack of jurisdictional boundaries, the statute
is to be construed in its entirety and not in segmented parts.
North Titanic Mining Co. v. Crockett, 75 Utah 259, 284 P.
328 (1929). Either the Statute defines the jurisdictional
boundaries of GSLA or it does not. If it does not, the Act
must fail and it is of no moment that Antelope Island is
otherwise mentioned in the unconstitutional statute or that
the Island lies in a surveyed area of the Lake. If the Statute
is invalid in part, it is presumptively invalid in whole unless it contains a "severability clause". Thfokol Chemical
Corp. v. Morrison County Tax Board, 184 A. 2d 75 (N. J.
1962). As indicated by this Court in Union Trust Company
v. Simmons, 116 Utah 422, 211 P. 2d 190 (1949), the question of severability is primarily one of legislative intent.
The wandering and vagrant nature of the GSLA Statute
is evidence that the constitutionality of the Law should be
measured as a whole and not in selected or isolated portions.
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The presumption of constitutionality of this Act as
claimed by Respondent, vanishes with the invalidity of the
arguments which Respondent has presented in its Brief to
sustain the same.
POINT III.
THE GSLA ACT IS CONSTITUTIONALLY INVALID BECAUSE OF UNLAWFUL DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY AND
STANDARDS.
The nub of Respondent's argument on this Point is
that under the modern view, wide latitude is given to the
construction of statutes which vest discretion in administrative agencies. Broad statements of legislative policy
along with authority to adopt administrative rules and
regulations is all, according to Respondent, that is necessary to satisfy the constitutional mandate that legislative
power cannot be delegated. Thus, the claim goes that the
statement in the Act that GSLA shall "administer and develop the Lake and its environs" when taken with agency
rule-making power, provides sufficient constitutional standards and safeguards, since the variety and complexity of
the GSLA program advises against any greater particularity. Resp. Br., pp. 11, 12, 14, 15. A look at the principles
laid down by this Court in Rowell v. State Bd. of Agriculture, 98 Utah 353, 99 P. 2d 1 (1940) and State v. Packard,
122 Utah 369, 250 P. 2d 561 (1952) on the necessity of
administrative standards in legislation, as well as the specification of duties and functions contained in the enabling
statutes of similar Utah administrative agencies, quickly

reveals the weakness of such argument. For the most part,
the main Brief of Appellant (pp. 15-21) is a rebuttal to
this contention of Respondent.
There is one part of Respondent's argument, however,
that should not pass without mention. Its position that the
phrase "administer and develop" places the Act beyond
constitutional attack because of vagueness, indefiniteness,
and unlawful legislative delegation, rests upon two decisions from other jurisdictions, Schecter v. Killingsworth,
(Ariz.) and In Re Bunker Hill Urban Renewal Project,
(Cal.) which Respondent claims are the leading authorities
on the legislative delegation issue. Before much stock is
put in this contention, the statutes under consideration in
Schecter and Bunker Hill should be examined.
In Schecter v. Killingsworth, 93 Ariz. 373, 380 P. 2d
136 (1963), the Supreme Court of Arizona had before it
for review the Arizona Financial Responsibility Act. A
codification of the Uniform Financial Responsibility Law
and consisting of better than 80 sections, the Act described
in great detail the duties, responsibilities and realm of
authority of the administrative official charged with its enforcement. It was urged therein, among other things, that
the Act was unconstitutional because it conferred upon the
administrator quasi-judicial powers. Noting that the Uniform Law had withstood similar constitutional attack in
four other jurisdictions, the Arizona Court upheld the law,
holding that the Act contained definite standards for legislative action and that delegation of quasi-judicial power did
not violate the separation-of-powers principle. That such
case, under its facts , could have achieved any other result

would have been little short of remarkable. No claim was
made in Schecter, as is made in the case at bar, that the
Financial Responsibility Act was without ascertainable
standards and safeguards or that a property owner could
not determine the effect of the Act upon his property
rights. Furthermore, while there was tested in the Schecter
case a Uniform Law, many times sustained, we have our
doubts that any court has had brought before it a statute
of a parallel to the GSLA Act.
Respondent contends that the facts and holding in
Bunker Hill Urban Renewal Project 1-B v. Goldman, 37
Cal. Rptr. 74, 389 P. 2d 538 (1964), are "particularly in
point" and present a "situation identical to the situation"
before this Court. In that case, the California Supreme
Court was, along with other issues, concerned with the
constitutionality of the California Urban Renewal Act.
(Parenthetically, the Utah Urban Redevelopment Law, 1115-1 thru 152. U.C.A., is largely patterned thereafter.)
True enough, the California Act provided for the development and redevelopment of real property within the urban
area. But that is where the similarity ends between it and
the GSLA Act. The meticulousness and almost painstaking
care with which the California Act describes the duties,
responsibilities, functions, procedures, and limits of administrative authority cannot be readily described. With
an almost microscopic eye, the Act defines the jurisdictional
boundaries of the urban agency, its powers, bonding requirements, limitations on development plans and projects,
contractual responsibilities, a step-by-step course to be followed in the urban development project, an owner-partici-
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pant plan, the extent to which private property rights can
be affected, and numerous other administrative assignments and limitations. Cal. Stats. Health §33792, §33707,
§33260-280. It takes more than 160 sections to define the
powers and duties of an urban agency under the Act. Upon
review of such specific provisions, the California Court
concluded that the Act could not be seriously challenged as
an unlawful delegation of legislative power. Under such a
systematic specification of administrative standards, our
quarrel is not with the decision rendered in Bunker Hill,
but with Respondent's claim that its facts present a "situation identical to the situation" in the GSLA Act.
So it is that Respondent hangs its argument upon
Schecter and Bunker Hill in saying that the words "administer and develop" in the GSLA Act satisfy the principle of
unlawful legislative delegation. How those decisions can
be compared with the facts of the instant suit is not at all
evident. The very nature of the statutes in the Schecter
and Bunker Hill cases make those rulings wholly irrelevant
to and of no authority in the immediate appeal. If Respondent's argument is worth its salt, it is so for other
reasons than that given in those decisions.
POINT IV.
THE GSLA ACT DOES NOT GRANT TO THE
AGENCY POWER TO CONDEMN ANTELOPE
ISLAND.
There are several arguments which Respondent makes
on this Point in its Brief which necessitate a reply. The
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thread of its claim that the Act does grant to GSLA the
power to condemn Antelope Island does not attempt to
diagnose the meaning of 65-8-6 ( 10) wherein it is provided
that with respect to the Island, GSLA is authorized to secure the same solely by "donation, purchase agreement,
lease, or other lawful means". Rather, Respondent contends
that the "implication" of the Statute confers upon the
Agency the power of eminent domain as to Antelope Island
as well as other properties within the jurisdictional boundaries (whatever those boundaries are). Resp. Br., pp.
20, 29, 31. The factors which are said to support that claim
are the subject of this rebuttal.
[1] The trouble with Respondent's theory is that
"implications" have nothing to do with the construction of
statutes involving the power to condemn property. The
power is either specifically or unequivocally granted or it
is withheld. The great body of case law in this country,
including that of this Court, is witness to the principle
that there is no such thing as condemnation by implication
in the enforcement of state statutes. See Bertagnoli v.
Baker, 117 Utah 348, 215 P. 2d 626 (1950), and other
authorities cited in App's. main Brief, pp. 22-27. Also see
McMechan v. Board of Education, 157 Ohio St. 241, 105 N.
E. 2d 270. Such principle is underpinned not only by the
rationale of the past, it is in the nature of constitutional
government as we now know it, an almost inherent prescript.
[ 2] Respondent argues on pages 27-29 of its Brief
that the issue herein of the right of GSLA to condemn
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Antelope Island is "mitigated to the point of complete
elimination" by the Act itself. That is so, it is said, because
65-8-6 (7) contains procedural safeguards which require
that GSLA exercise the eminent domain power in accordance with the general laws of Utah on eminent domain , 7834-1 et seq., U.C.A. 1953. Portions of 78-34-4 regarding
factors to be shown in any condemnation suit, i. e., public
use, necessity, etc., are then reviewed by Respondent. Resp.
Br., p. 28. Somehow the conclusion is drawn therefrom
that because of the "limitation" that the general eminent
domain laws place on GSLA's discretion, the power is
granted in the GSLA Act to expropriate Antelope Island.
The argument thus made by Respondent does not appreciate the issue raised by Appellant before this Court.
The question posed is not whether the eminent domain
power has been exercised properly herein for a public and
necessary use. It is the more fundamental question of
whether the power exists, at all, to exercise with respect to
Antelope Island. We are concerned not with an arbitrary
execution of the condemnation power on the Island as Respondent suggests, but with the authenticity of the power,
the thing itself. Respondent's argument glides right over
the issue present in this appeal.
Even were such argument relevant to the issue on review, it is of no help to the infirmity of Respondent's position. Notwithstanding the specific reference in the GSLA
Act to the general eminent domain statute, it is well accepted and this Court has so held that 78-34-1 et seq. is
implementive of Article I, Section 22, Utah Constitution,
and that all suits brought to condemn private property are
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subject to those provisions. Board of Education of Logan
City V. Croft, 13 U. 2d 310, 373 P. 2d 697 (1962); State
Road Commission v. Salt Lake City Board of Educatwn, 13
U. 2d 56, 368 P. 2d 468 (1962).
[3] On pages 29-31 of its Brief, Respondent makes
its closing argument on the issue of the right to condemn.
It is contended that to interpret the Act so as to deny
GSLA the power to condemn Antelope Island while recognizing such power as to other lands within the jurisdictional boundaries, would "grant special immunities and
privileges" to the owners of the Island and render the Act
as special legislation in violation of Article 6, Section
26(16), Utah Constitution. Since the Legislature could not
have intended such unconstitutional consequences, it is said
that the Act must be construed so as to grant the power to
condemn Antelope Island.
There are several reasons why this phase of Respondent's argument is without merit:
A.

The biggest difficulty with this theory is that it
assumes that under the argument advanced by
Appellant herein, the owners of Antelope Island
would be granted special immunity and privileges.
For that purpose, it focuses attention upon what
is given or granted by the Act to the owners of
the Island. That is where the difficulty lies. The
query is not what the Act grants to the owners of
the Island but rather, what did the Legislature
delegate and grant to GSLA regarding the condemnation of Antelope Island. The contention that
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the Legislature did so delegate and grant the
power must be won by an affirmative finding to
that effect in the Act, and not by twisting the
issue to say that unless GSLA is determined to
have the power as to Antelope Island, the Statute
is unconstitutional. The Act grants nothing to
the owners of the Island.
B.

Since the power of eminent domain is one of strict
delegation by the Legislature, it may be granted
or withheld as to specific property, properties or
regions. The Legislature, in creating the power
where none had previously existed, may place restrictions upon it and the administrative agency,
GSLA, takes the power subject to those restrictions. McElrath V. United States, 102 U. S. 426
(1880). This Court may judicially notice the
Statute of some years past authorizing the Utah
State Engineering Commission to condemn property for "This is the Place Monument" in Salt
Lake County. Laws of Utah, 1951, Special Session. The eminent domain power was therein
granted only as to particular property and withheld as to other lands, all of which lay within the
monument site. The GSLA Act achieves the same
result in 65-8-6 ( 10) by authorizing the acquisition
of Antelope Island by "donation, purchase agreement, lease, or other lawful means", exclusive of
the condemnation power which is granted as to
other lands under 65-8-6 ( 1) .
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C.

Not one case is cited by Respondent as authority
for the proposition that a Statute which grants to
an administrative agency power to condemn certain lands and withholds the power as to other
property within the territorial boundaries, is unconstitutional as special legislation. Lorenz et al.
V. Campbell, 110 Vt. ____ , 3 A. 2d 548 (1939), cited
by Appellant on page 30 of its Brief, involved a
condemnation statute as to particular property,
which under Respondent's theory, should have
been declared unconstitutional as granting special
immunity and privilege to others. It was not so
held.

D.

The claim that Respondent has been granted
power to condemn Antelope Island because "the
GSLA Act is unconstitutional if the power has not
been granted", is a non-sequitur. Respondent can
neither sustain its right to condemn the Island,
nor the constitutionality of the GSLA Act by such
a "bootstrap" doctrine. If the Act is special legislation as suggested by Respondent, it is merely
another cornerstone, in addition to those raised
by Appellant in Points II and III of this Appeal,
to a determination that the Statute is, in law,
constitutionally unenforceable. That being the
case, the entire Act would fail, it being not severable one paragraph from another.

The fundamental issue raised by Appellant in this Point
has gone unanswered by Respondent. That issue is : what
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meaning is to be given to 65-8-6(10) which provides that
Antelope Island may be acquired only by "donation, purchase agreement, lease, or other lawful means". The employment by Appellant of two canons of construction to resolve the uncertainty in the above-referenced section of the
phrase "or other lawful means", has not been attacked by
Respondent in its Brief, save to say that such interpretive
aids cannot be used to defeat the "clear legislative intent".
Resp. Br. p. 19. That argument only begs the question however, because it is to determine the "clear legislative intent"
that the canons of construction are utilized.
Respondent's Brief is in total default on the stand of
Appellant in Point IV (3), pp. 33-36 of the main Brief,
that the special means of acquisition of Antelope Island set
forth in 65-8-6 ( 10) controls and takes precedence over the
general means of acquiring property set out in 65-8-6 ( 1).
If, as Respondent contends, the Legislature intended that
the acquisition of Antelope Island was to be governed by
the general clause in 65-8-6 (1), why then did the Legislature designate as the only means, "donation, purchase
agreement, lease or other lawful means", in referring to
the Island in 65-8-6(10)? Are we to presume that the Legislature was engaged in a mere penmanship exercise when it
wrote the means of acquiring Antelope Island into 65-86 (10)? That is the presumption which this Court must
make if Respondent's argument is adopted. It is to hold
that the entire second sentence of 65-8-6 (10) is of no legal
significance, that it is legislative surplusage, and that the
power of Respondent to condemn Antelope Island is to be
measured as though that sentence were not part of the law
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at all. Such a result emasculates the Statute as well as all
canons of statutory construction.
CONCLUSION
Respondent says that Appellant's reading of the GSLA
Act is mechanical, inflexible, and does not realize the spirit
of the law. The short answer to that assertion is that about
all with which this Court and the parties have to work is
the ordinary meaning of the English language. If this
Court must read between line~ to realize the spirit of the
law, if it must interpolate in what has been left out, or if
it must read out what is plainly in, then the judicial proicess has become one of impulse, as permanent as the fleeting moment, and as changing as the personalities of men.
If so, what then do we do with statements such as that IOf
the late Felix Frankfurter when he said:

"* * * A judge must not rewrite a statute,
neither to enlarge nor to contract it.
"An omission at the time of enactment, whether
careless or calculated, cannot be judicially supplied
however much later wisdom may recommend the
inclusion.
"But there are more fundamental objections to
loose judicial reading. Their (the legislature's) responsibility is discharged ultimately by words. They
are under a special duty therefore to observe that
'Exactness in the use of words is the basis of all
serious thinking. You will get nowhere without it.' "
Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of
Statutes, 47 Colum. L. Rev. 527 (1947).
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The GSLA Act means what it says and it must be, for
better or worse, interpreted as it was enacted and stands.
The Statute is constitutionally unenforceable for failure to
define jurisdictional boundaries and for unlawful delegation of legislative standards and authority. In no event
does the Act empower Respondent to condemn Antelope
Island, the property of Appellant.
The Complaint of Respondent should be accordingly
dismissed.
Respectfully submitted,
ROBERT S. CAMPBELL, JR.,
of and for
PARSONS,BEHLE,EVANS
& LATIMER,
520 Kearns Building.,
Salt Lake City, Utah,
Attorney for AppeUant.

